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INTRODUCTION
The economic downturn that occurred in 2008 created a financial crisis for local
governments throughout the nation. The primary cause of their financial problems was the drop
in housing prices and consumer spending that resulted in significant revenue declines at the local
level (Hoene & Pagano, 2011). However, decisions made by elected officials throughout the
past decade also resulted in a dramatic increase in personnel costs. Specifically, decisions related
to employee pension benefits were based upon revenue projections and pension funding
assumptions that have been proven to be unreasonably optimistic (San Mateo County Civil
Grand Jury, 2009). The dismal performance of the financial markets affected pension funds
because they relied upon optimistic asset growth assumptions for pension funding calculations.
Without consistently positive annual financial returns, CalPERS and other pension
administrators have been forced to require higher contributions from public agencies to fund
retirement benefits (CalPERS, 2009).
As a result of these factors, local governments throughout California are considering
pension reform as one tool for preserving financial stability and integrity (League of California
Cities, 2011). This study analyzes the effect of the recent economic downturn on public
agencies, focuses on Palo Alto and Sunnyvale, and addresses the key question facing
policymakers as to whether pension reform is an effective solution for addressing the financial
issues that threaten to cripple local governmentV¶DELOLW\WRSURYLGHGLUHFWVHUYLFHVWRWKHLU
residents. If pension reform is effective, then what is the optimal way within existing contractual
constraints to equitably implement a change in employee benefit programs? If pension reform is
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not effective, then what other strategies should policymakers consider to mitigate employee costs
and ensure the long-term success of vital public services?

Local Government Revenue Decline
The fundamental cause of the recent local government fiscal crisis stemmed from an
abrupt drop in local revenues due to the economic downturn. Not only did revenue sources
decline at a significant rate, but local governments in California have a limited ability to increase
revenues on an annual basis. Much of this is due to the fact that two of the fundamental sources
of revenue for California cities are property tax and sales tax. Together these two revenue bases
can account for more than 80 percent of local tax revenue. Furthermore, in 2006, property tax
and sales tax accounted for approximately 37 percent of all local government revenues (Hill,
2007). Aside from property tax and sales tax, the majority of local revenues come from fees,
charges and intergovernmental aid (Coleman, 2005).
In California, Proposition 13 effectively prevents local governments from controlling the
amount of property tax revenue they can receive and the Bradley-Burns Act limits the local
government share of sales tax to one percent of total taxable sales (Hill, 2007). Local districts are
permitted to increase the sales tax rate by up to one additional percent with voter approval.
However, since any sales tax increase must be approved by voters, future increases may be
unlikely given the national recession (California Board of Equalization, 2010).
According to a 2010 National League of Cities (NLC) survey, general fund revenues
declined 2.5 percent from 2008 to 2009 (Hoene & Pagano, 2010). In 2011 the NLC survey
showed that national fiscal conditions improved slightly; however, 57 percent of city finance
officers responded that their cities are in a worse condition than in 2010. General fund revenues
4
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declined 3.8 percent from 2009 to 2010 and respondents projected that general fund revenues
would decline another 2.3 percent in 2011. When including the projections for 2011, city
revenues have declined for five straight years (Hoene and Pagano 2011).
Data from the US Census bureau shows that state and local tax revenue collection has
only grown at an average rate of 1.7 percent over the past 6 years with only 1 year, 2007, having
growth of over 2 percent (United States Census Bureau, 2011). Over this same time period, the
national inflation rate has averaged 2.6 percent. Therefore, adjusting for inflation, the real local
tax revenue growth rate has actually been negative (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011). Since this
data is an aggregation of tax collections for all states, which have different tax structures, it is
more informative to focus on sales and property tax growth rates. Property tax is relatively
consistent and stable, and its average annual growth has closely mirrored overall growth at 1.7
percent. However, sales tax, which is directly related to local economic activity and can be much
more volatile on a year to year basis, has only grown at an average rate of 1.4 percent (United
States Census Bureau, 2011).
When looking at the revenue data on a quarterly basis compared to the prior year, the
recent declines become much more evident. Beginning in 2006, states saw 12 straight quarters of
growth, averaging 5.3 percent. Rapid decline began in the first quarter of 2009, when states saw
three straight quarters of declining revenue. This resulted in a two year period of overall decline,
which averaged -0.8 percent over the two year period. Sales tax revenues were the driving force
behind the declines as the two year period beginning in 2009 resulted in an average quarterly
decline of 2 percent (United States Census Bureau, 2011).
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Looking at similar data in the Silicon Valley provides a more telling example of the
revenue-related issues that are affecting local government. Graph 1 combines general fund data
from Palo Alto and Sunnyvale and shows that property and sales tax revenues declined in FY
2008-09 and had minimal growth in FY 2009-10.
Graph 1

Sources Used: City of Palo Alto 2007-17 Long Range Financial Forecast; City of Palo Alto 2008-18 Long Range Financial Forecast; City of
Palo Alto 2009-19 Long Range Financial Forecast; City of Palo Alto Long Range Financial Forecast Fiscal Years 2010 to 2020; City of Palo
Alto Long Range Financial Forecast Fiscal Years 2011 to 2021; City of Sunnyvale Adopted Budget and Resource Allocation Plan Fiscal Year
2007/2008; City of Sunnyvale Adopted Budget and Resource Allocation Plan Fiscal Year 2008/2009; City of Sunnyvale Adopted Budget and
Resource Allocation Plan Fiscal Year 2009/2010; City of Sunnyvale Adopted Budget and Resource Allocation Plan Fiscal Year 2010/2011; City
of Sunnyvale Adopted Budget and Resource Allocation Plan Fiscal Year 2011/2012.

The primary cause of the revenue stagnation in Palo Alto and Sunnyvale was a severe
drop in sales tax revenues. Graph 2 shows that although property tax revenues steadily increased
over the past five years, sales tax revenues have fallen by nearly 17 percent since FY 2007-08.
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Graph 2

Sources Used: City of Palo Alto 2007-17 Long Range Financial Forecast; City of Palo Alto 2008-18 Long Range Financial Forecast; City of
Palo Alto 2009-19 Long Range Financial Forecast; City of Palo Alto Long Range Financial Forecast Fiscal Years 2010 to 2020; City of Palo
Alto Long Range Financial Forecast Fiscal Years 2011 to 2021; City of Sunnyvale Adopted Budget and Resource Allocation Plan Fiscal Year
2007/2008; City of Sunnyvale Adopted Budget and Resource Allocation Plan Fiscal Year 2008/2009; City of Sunnyvale Adopted Budget and
Resource Allocation Plan Fiscal Year 2009/2010; City of Sunnyvale Adopted Budget and Resource Allocation Plan Fiscal Year 2010/2011; City
of Sunnyvale Adopted Budget and Resource Allocation Plan Fiscal Year 2011/2012.

Although the recent downturn in local tax revenue has had an immediate fiscal impact,
the effects are even more significant when applied to long term revenue forecasts. Graph 3 shows
the recent property and sales tax revenue compared to the FY 2007-08 revenue forecasts
developed by Palo Alto and Sunnyvale.
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Graph 3

Sources Used: City of Palo Alto 2007-17 Long Range Financial Forecast; City of Palo Alto 2008-18 Long Range Financial Forecast; City of
Palo Alto 2009-19 Long Range Financial Forecast; City of Palo Alto Long Range Financial Forecast Fiscal Years 2010 to 2020; City of Palo
Alto Long Range Financial Forecast Fiscal Years 2011 to 2021; City of Sunnyvale Adopted Budget and Resource Allocation Plan Fiscal Year
2007/2008; City of Sunnyvale Adopted Budget and Resource Allocation Plan Fiscal Year 2008/2009; City of Sunnyvale Adopted Budget and
Resource Allocation Plan Fiscal Year 2009/2010; City of Sunnyvale Adopted Budget and Resource Allocation Plan Fiscal Year 2010/2011; City
of Sunnyvale Adopted Budget and Resource Allocation Plan Fiscal Year 2011/2012.

Graph 3 shows that both cities expected property and sales tax revenues to continue on a
stable trajectory throughout the end of the decade. By FY 2009-10, the two cities expected to
receive over $120 million in property and sales tax revenue; however, the actual revenue
received was only $113.1 million. In their FY 2007-08 projections, Palo Alto and Sunnyvale
overestimated their future revenues by over $9.2 million.
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Local Government Expenditure Increases
At the same time that local governments have experienced decreasing revenue growth
rates, expenditures have significantly increased. In particular, pension related expenditures have
become a primary concern. In the October 2010 NLC survey, over 81 percent of finance officers
said that increasing pension costs were a primary factor affecting city budgets (Hoene & Pagano,
2010). The 2011 NLC survey showed that pension costs had become a larger concern as 84
SHUFHQWRIUHVSRQGHQWVFLWHGSHQVLRQFRVWVDVKDYLQJDQHJDWLYHLPSDFWRQWKHLUFLW\¶VILVFDO
condition (Hoene & Pagano, 2011). While the NLC surveys capture nationwide responses,
California cities face a similar situation. According to a 2009 Public Policy Institute of
California (PPIC) study, over 90 percent of cities claim that pension costs are important factors
in expenditure growth. The PPIC survey also showed that most local governments in California
took various steps in FY 2008-09 to realign expenditures with revenues. Seventy one percent of
respondents used hiring freezes, fifteen percent used furloughs, thirteen percent used wage
reductions and thirty percent used layoffs to balance their budget. Furthermore, when asked
about their strategy for future years, thirty percent of respondents anticipated using layoffs and
thirty seven percent anticipated using wage reductions to keep expenses under control (Neiman
& Krimm, 2009).
Local governments in the Bay Area have also taken notice of the increasing personnel
costs. In 2008 and 2009, the San Mateo Civil Grand Jury and the Santa Clara County Civil
Grand Jury both studied the impacts of employee compensation costs. The San Mateo Civil
Grand Jury found that during the dot-com boom city services and staff expanded, and salaries
and pensions were embedded in union contracts. As the economy struggled throughout the
9
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decade, expenses continued to grow and they are expected to grow even more throughout the
next decade. The majority of cities in San Mateo County now spend approximately 70 percent of
their general fund budget on employee compensation and they expect employee costs to increase
by at least four percent per year for at least five years (San Mateo County Civil Grand Jury,
2009). The Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury found similar results in 2009. Their study found
that wages have steadily increased, pension and healthcare benefits have significantly increased,
and that total compensation FRVWVQRZWKUHDWHQFLWLHV¶ILVFDOVWDELOLW\. Comparing total employee
costs from 2000-01 to 2009-10, the Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury found that employee
compensation costs as a percentage of general fund expenditures have increased by 15 percent.
When calculated on a cost per employee basis, non-safety employee costs have increased 37
percent and safety employee costs have increased 41 percent since 2000-01. During this time
period, inflation increased by 27 percent (Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury, 2010).

Defined Benefit Pension Overview
As is shown by the financial surveys and Civil Grand Jury reports, rising defined benefit
pension costs have become a focal point for local governments. There are various forms of
defined benefit pension plans; however, the general formula is to pay a certain percentage of an
HPSOR\HH¶Vfinal year salary upon their retirement. This formula provides for a fixed percentage
of salary for each year of service, meaning that the total pension amount increases with each year
of service. For example, a pension plan that offers 2 percent for each year of service would
provide 40 percent RIWKHHPSOR\HH¶VVDODU\IRUWKHUHVWRIWKHLUOLIHDfter 20 years of service, or
60 percent after 30 years of service (CalPERS, 2011b).
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Pension funding formulas are based on a three part contribution structure: employer
contribution, employee contribution, and return on investment of the fund. Employers and
employees typically pay a certain percentage of employee salaries to pension administrators such
as CalPERS (CalPERS, 2011b). While employee contributions are typically a fixed percentage
of their salary, the employer contribution percentage is set by actuarial formulas and varies
among different agencies. In the medium sized cities in the Bay Area, this percentage ranges
between 10 and 40 percent, meaning that for every dollar an employer pays in salary, it pays up
to an additional $0.10 to $0.40 to fund future pension obligations (CalPERS, 2011d). Funds are
LQYHVWHGDQQXDOO\RYHUDQHPSOR\HH¶VZRUNLQJOLIHDQGWKHLQYHVWHGPRQH\LVH[SHFWHGWRJURZ
in value to match the lifetime payout during retirement (CalPERS, 2011b).
In the statewide CalPERS system, local agency retirement plans are divided into two
categories. Sworn police and fire employees are grouped into the Safety plan, while all other
employees are grouped into the Miscellaneous plan. These two plans have different benefit levels
and CalPERS provides annual actuarial statements for each plan that shows the annual costs and
describes the assumptions used in calculating future contribution rates (CalPERS, 2011b).
Perhaps the most challenging aspect of the pension funding formula for local government
financial planning is that the annual contribution rate is controlled by the pension administrators
and can be changed from year to year depending on actuarial changes and financial market
SHUIRUPDQFH:KHQVWRFNYDOXHVZHUHULVLQJGXULQJWKHODWH¶VVRPHORFDOJRYHUQPHQW
retirement plDQVZHUHFODVVLILHGDV³VXSHUIXQGHG´7KLVUHVXOWHGLQGHFUHDVHGDQQXDOSHQVLRQ
funding requirements and gave local agencies more flexibility with respect to pension benefits.
As a result, many local governments chose to enhance their pension plans and offer more
11
!

generous pension benefits. When the economy experienced two recessions in the past decade, the
invested assets that were used to provide pension benefits shrank and pension administrators
required higher annual contributions. The employer contribution rates rose to unsustainable
levels, and have now provided a catalyst for local pension reform efforts (San Mateo County
City Managers Association, 2009).
In 2008, state and local government employee retirement systems lost nearly $180
billion, or about 5 percent of their value. According to the chief of the Census BXUHDX¶V
*RYHUQPHQWV'LYLVLRQ³6hortfalls in state and local government pension plans may have longterm consequences for some state and local governments´ United States Census Bureau, 2010b,
p.1). Data from the Census Bureau shows that from September 2007 through March 2009, state
and local pension funds lost more than 28 percent. In those 21 months, there were only two
quarters of positive growth, however, both of those positive quarters showed gains of less than 1
percent. In the two years following March 2009, pension funds gained 31 percent, however the
total combined assets of pension funds is still lower than it was in 2007 (United States Census
Bureau, 2010a).
The CalPERS investment portfolio is comprised of a broad range of assets including
stocks, bonds and real estate investments. Their stated target for investment return is 7.75 percent
and over the past 20 years, the average annual investment return has been 7.9 percent (CalPERS,
2011b). On a fiscal year basis, there have only been four years of negative returns since 1990.
Two of those years occurred during the dot-com bust of 2001 and 2002, when the investment
fund lost 7.1 percent and 6.0 percent, respectively. In 2008 and 2009 the investment fund lost 4.9
percent and 23.4 percent, respectively. During the same time period, there were thirteen years
12
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where returns exceeded ten percent (CalPERS, 2011a). However, the most recent decline in 2009
was so severe that it shattered long term projections. In order to mitigate the effects of the recent
decline, CalPERS elected to use a smoothing method that isolated all gains and losses from FY
2008-09 to FY 2010-11. Under this method, the effects of the recent downturn are treated as
separate from the rest of the portfolio and will be paid for separately from all other liabilities
(CalPERS, 2009).
In addition to the effects of the stock market decline, CalPERS pension funding expenses
have also increased as a result of updated actuarial assumptions. In April 2010, the CalPERS
Actuarial Office released the CalPERS Experience Study: 1997 to 2007. The purpose of the
study was to compare the current actuarial assumptions to the actual results of the system and to
develop new assumptions to apply to future pension funding formulas. The study reviewed ten
years of demographic data on all members that participate in the California Public Employees
Retirement Fund, including state employees, school employees and public agencies. Data was
gathered regarding retirement rates, termination rates, mortality rates, and salary increase rates,
and the updated data was used to modify the actuarial formulas for employer contribution rates
effective in FY 2011-2012 (CalPERS, 2010a; CalPERS Actuarial Office, 2010).
The study revealed three primary factors that have affected the pension funding formulas.
First, life expectancy has increased for all members. The life expectancy for males has increased
by one year and the life expectancy for females has increased by approximately four months.
This means that pension benefits must be provided for a longer period of time, and therefore
additional funding is required. Second, the age in which miscellaneous members retire is slightly
lower than expected and is slightly higher than expected for public safety members. The study
13
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attributed these changes in retirement ages to the passage of SB 400, which increased benefits to
members and therefore provided additional incentive to retire early. Increased retirement rates
are also believed to be caused by the recent economic downturn and the resulting changes to the
work environment, such as furloughs. The final factor that changed as a result of the experience
study was higher than expected salary increases for members with higher years of service.
Previously, it was assumed that members with higher years of service would reach a plateau
where their salaries would only increase by the overall rate of wage inflation. However, the study
showed that in addition to wage inflation, members with higher years of service actually
continue to receive increases due to seniority, merit and promotion. This is thought to be the
UHVXOWRISURPRWLRQDORSSRUWXQLWLHVODWHLQLQGLYLGXDO¶VFDUHHUVDQGJUHDWHUWKDQH[SHFWHGVDODU\
increases (CalPERS Actuarial Office, 2010).
The increased costs associated with the stock market declines and the recent experience
study can be seen in the unfunded liability figures provided by CalPERS. The tables below show
the effects of the recent changes for Palo Alto and Sunnyvale. These two cities have seen their
unfunded liabilities nearly double since 2005 and, consequently, the projected increases to their
contribution rates have nearly doubled to pay for the increased costs.
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Table 1: Unfunded Liability
Palo Alto
Safety

Sunnyvale
Safety

Palo Alto
Miscellaneous

Sunnyvale
Miscellaneous

2005

$23,862,338

$52,537,831

$52,502,825

$28,528,449

2006

$27,777,775

$52,634,012

$52,668,486

$47,890,724

2007

$26,453,429

$56,104,384

$58,082,037

$41,712,944

2008

$30,080,374

$58,010,769

$63,500,255

$49,051,264

2009

$44,018,407

$75,503,671

$100,435,301

$72,921,246

Sources Used: Actuarial Valuation as of June 30, 2009 for the Miscellaneous Plan of the City of Palo Alto: Required Contributions for Fiscal
Year July 1, 2011 ± June 30, 2012; Actuarial Valuation as of June 30, 2009 for the Miscellaneous Plan of the City of Sunnyvale: Required
Contributions for Fiscal Year July 1, 2011 ± June 30, 201; Actuarial Valuation as of June 30, 2009 for the Safety Plan of the City of Palo Alto:
Required Contributions for Fiscal Year July 1, 2011 ± June 30, 2012; Actuarial Valuation as of June 30, 2009 for the Safety Plan of the City of
Sunnyvale: Required Contributions for Fiscal Year July 1, 2011 ± June 30, 2012.

Table 2: Contribution Rate for Unfunded Liability
Palo Alto
Safety

Sunnyvale
Safety

Palo Alto
Miscellaneous

Sunnyvale
Miscellaneous

2005

6.84%

10.71%

6.58%

3.40%

2006

7.72%

11.46%

6.43%

6.29%

2007

7.13%

11.19%

6.92%

5.52%

2008

7.70%

10.77%

7.47%

6.84%

2009

12.31%

14.26%

11.63%

9.57%

Sources Used: Actuarial Valuation as of June 30, 2009 for the Miscellaneous Plan of the City of Palo Alto: Required Contributions for Fiscal
Year July 1, 2011 ± June 30, 2012; Actuarial Valuation as of June 30, 2009 for the Miscellaneous Plan of the City of Sunnyvale: Required
Contributions for Fiscal Year July 1, 2011 ± June 30, 201; Actuarial Valuation as of June 30, 2009 for the Safety Plan of the City of Palo Alto:
Required Contributions for Fiscal Year July 1, 2011 ± June 30, 2012; Actuarial Valuation as of June 30, 2009 for the Safety Plan of the City of
Sunnyvale: Required Contributions for Fiscal Year July 1, 2011 ± June 30, 2012.
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Unfortunately, many of the factors that have resulted in increased pension costs were not
adequately forecasted in 2007 when Palo Alto and Sunnyvale granted increased benefit plans to
their employees. In their 2007-17 Long Range Financial Forecast (2007), Palo Alto claimed that
³WKHFRVWRIWKHUHWLUHPHQWEHQHILWLVRIIVHWRYHUWLPHE\DFRQWDLQPHQWRIPHGLFDOFRVWVDQGE\
HPSOR\HHVSD\LQJDSRUWLRQRIWKHUHWLUHPHQWEHQHILW«,WLVFULWLFDOWRQRWHWKDWCalPERS
inveVWPHQWVKDYHLPSURYHGGUDPDWLFDOO\VLQFHWR«3HQVLRQH[SHQVHVDUHH[SHFWHGWR
OHYHORXWLQVXEVHTXHQW\HDUV´ (p.10-11). Their long range forecast included a graph showing
that the city expected their contributions to remain near 25 percent of payroll for their public
safety employees and near 16 percent for their miscellaneous employees (City of Palo Alto,
2007).
The City of Sunnyvale made similar miscalculations. In their FY 2007-08 budget, they
claimed that the increased costs of retirement enhancement would be fully offset by salary
concessions offered by miscellaneous employees. It was thought that a lower salary base would
result in enough savings to offset the anticipated cost of the enhanced benefits. In addition,
Sunnyvale created reserve accounts that were thought to be sufficient to cover CalPERS rate
uncertainties in the future (City of Sunnyvale, 2007).
LITERATURE REVIEW
As governments have trimmed their budgets to adjust to decreasing revenues and
increased expenditures, pension plans have become a hot-button topic. Certain interest groups
have demanded public pension reform, in large part because they believe that public servants are
relatively overpaid and enjoy retirement security that is no longer available for private sector
workers. 2QHRIWKHPRVWSXEOLFO\GHEDWHGVWXGLHVRQ&DOLIRUQLD¶VSXEOLFSHQVLRQV\VWHPVZDV
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FRQGXFWHGE\WKH/LWWOH+RRYHU&RPPLVVLRQLQ)HEUXDU\7KHVWXG\IRXQG&DOLIRUQLD¶V
SHQVLRQSODQVWREH³GDQJHURXVO\XQGHUIXQGHG´DVDUHVXOWRI³RYHUO\JHQHURXVEHQHILWSURPLVHV´
DQGXUJHQWO\SURPRWHG³DJJUHVVLYHUHIRUPV´WRDYRLGVLJQLILFDQWVHUYLFHUHGXFWLRQV7KHVWXG\
VKRZHGWKDWDVRIQRQHRI&DOLIRUQLD¶VWHQODUJHVWGHILQHGEHnefit systems were more than
74 percent funded and that CalPERS was only 61 percent funded. The four primary
recommendations were:
1) State and local governments must pursue aggressive strategies to reduce growing pension
liabilities.
2) California should move to a hybrid retirement model.
3) Immediate action must be taken to realign pension benefits and expectations.
4) Transparency and accountability must be improved (Little Hoover Commission, 2011).
Among the many assertions and findings in the study, there was one that was particularly
sobering. Due to the legal protections that treat pension systems as public debt, it is nearly
impossible for state and local governments to significantly alter their current obligations. This
means that pension funds will not become bankrupt because pension systems can force
employers to contribute any amount necessary to cover their expenses, and these additional
contributions will come at the expense of other government services (Little Hoover Commission,
2011). Although the Little Hoover Commission aggregated CalPERS data and did not provide
projections regarding potential savings associated with alternative pension plans, it did provide a
comprehensive overview of the current state of California pension plans and helped frame the
impending pension reform debate.
17
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A 2010 article in Public Administration Review analyzed state pension systems throughout
the United States and found that in 2007, before the economic downturn, the total amount of
unfunded pension liabilities was over $360 billion. Yet, despite these staggering numbers, state
governments are hesitant to reduce benefits because they face an impending human capital crisis
in which the baby boomer generation is preparing to retire and take with it their vital skills and
institutional knowledge. At the same time, states face increasing competition with the private
sector for qualified employees and the authors argue that benefits are extremely valuable for
prospective employees (Coggburn & Kearney, 2010). Although this article focuses on statelevel pension systems and the statistical determinants of unfunded liability, such as per capita
income and public employee density, it does provide a good context for the debate surrounding
the financial costs of employee benefits. Furthermore, the authors explore the potential
consequences of ballooning unfunded liabilities which can include downgraded credit ratings,
increased borrowing costs, and decreased service levels (Coggburn & Kearney, 2010).
An inherent assumption in the pension reform debate is that government employees are
provided compensation that is out of line with the private sector (Santa Clara County Civil Grand
Jury, 2010). However, a 2010 study by the Economic Policy Institute shows that public
employees are not necessarily overcompensated when accounting for factors such as education,
experience and workload. In fact, the study shows that public employees may be slightly
undercompensated (Keefe, 2010).
One of the most difficult aspects of creating a meaningful comparison between the public
sector and the private sector is that the nature of work is vastly different. For example, there are
no true comparisons for core public sector functions such as public safety or education.
18
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Furthermore, the mix of salary and benefits can be dramatically different. In order to create a
more effective comparison, the Economic Policy Institute study compared full-time public and
private sector employees and also controlled for hours worked per year, organizational size, and
education level (Keefe, 2010).
In terms of organizational size, the study found that the mix of salary and benefits was very
similar when comparing public sector employers to private sector employers that have more than
500 employees. The study also found that public sector employees are more highly educated,
with more than 54 percent of the workforce having at least a four-year college degree. Only 35
percent of private sector employees have a four year degree. Salaries of college educated publicsector employees were found to be more than 25 percent less than similarly educated private
sector workers, and the disparity is more than 30 percent for public sector employees with
Masters or Doctorate degrees. However, public sector employees with less than a four-year
degree were found to earn between five and ten percent more than similarly educated private
sector employees (Keefe, 2010). While the Economic Policy Institute did not specifically address
pension reform, their analysis of compensation levels helps define the debate regarding the
appropriate level of compensation for public sector employees.
Joshua Franzel, the vice president of research for the Center for State and Local Government
Excellence, addressed the issues that many public sector agencies face when trying to recruit and
retain a qualified workforce. According to his research, growth in the public sector workforce
has outpaced the private sector and the public sector jobs are projected to expand rapidly over the
next decade. Much of the expansion will be a result of increased demand for education and
healthcare professionals. His research also shows that public sector employers are currently
19
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offering a competitive mix of compensation benefits for specialized occupations such as finance
DQGLQIRUPDWLRQWHFKQRORJ\)UDQ]HO¶VDQDO\VLVRIZDJHVDQGEHQHILWVIRUILQDQFHDQG
information technology employees showed that the public sector is in an advantageous position
to compete for professional skills due to defined benefit plans and relative job security. However,
his analysis also showed that the financial and technical demands on public sector employers will
continue to increase as the public demands more efficiency and transparency in their operations
(Franzel, 2009). $VZDVWKHFDVHZLWKWKH(FRQRPLF3ROLF\,QVWLWXWH¶VVWXG\)UDQ]HOGRHVQRW
specifically address pension reform; however, his analysis shows that potential reductions to
public sector benefits may inhibit local governments from attracting and retaining qualified
employees to deliver services to their residents.
In this era of increasing demands and limited resources, local governments must devise
strategies to operate more efficiently. At the very least, the public sector should examine their
personnel budgets to ensure they are operating at full capacity. A recent article in Government

F inance Review offers guidance for increasing efficiency. In the article, John Fishbein and David
Vehaun focus on developing more accurate expenditure forecasting models and achieving
greater control over expenditures in order to effectively manage personnel budgets (Fishbein &
Vehaun, 2009).
According to Fishbein and Vehaun, a key area of personnel budgeting is managing vacant
positions. Since not all positions are continually filled, policies should be enacted that define
how much money is designated toward anticipated vacancies. Accurate projections of anticipated
start dates can help avoid large shortfalls or surpluses. Analyzing past trends to determine the
organizational or departmental turnover rate is also helpful. Finally, tracking and quantifying
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unfunded, frozen or eliminated positions are effective ways to ensure greater budget accuracy
(Fishbein & Vehaun, 2009).
$QRWKHUFRPSRQHQWRIHIIHFWLYHEXGJHWPDQDJHPHQWLVGHWHUPLQLQJWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V
optimal staffing level. This can be achieved by comparing an organization to other similar
organizations in the area. An important metric for comparison can be a population to employee
ratio for jurisdictions of similar size or service levels. An alternative strategy could include
classifying positions by goal whereby hiring decisions and staffing models are based on specific
functions or initiatives (Fishbein & Vehaun, 2009).
When attempting to reduce the cost of service provision, the use of seasonal or temporary
employees can be effective. These types of employees work less hours and are often provided
limited benefits compared to full time employees. Utilizing volunteers in certain functions can
also help reduce the costs associated with providing services (Fishbein & Vehaun, 2009).
In addition to analyzing staffing models, the article suggests examining compensation levels.
The continual process of evaluating step and grade systems can include wage surveys to
determine the level of compensation that is provided by similar organizations. The final strategy
recommended by Fishbein and Vehaun is privatization and shared services. These alternate
service delivery models can be an effective strategy for reducing the costs of service provision
and increasing the efficiency of the organization (Fishbein & Vehaun, 2009).
Although improving personnel budgeting can be an effective strategy for improving
efficiency and reducing employee compensation costs, it is clear that the current defined benefit
pension plans offered by local governments are becoming increasingly burdensome. The recent
macroeconomic events have spurred a debate on the wisdom of offering defined benefit plans to
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public servants and many have suggested that public sector pension plans be changed to defined
contribution plans that are common in the private sector.
This debate is not unique to the present time. In a 2005 study published in Government

F inance Review, Kenneth Brainard and Sandra Fabry discussed the relative merits of each type
of retirement plan. According to Brainard, 91 percent of federal employees believe that defined
benefit pension plans were an important factor in their decision to work for the federal
government and he claims that the costs associated with administering defined benefit plans are
significantly less than defined contribution plans. In addition, defined benefit plans are a more
effective means of providing financial security to retired employees because they earn higher
investment returns and have fewer assets borrowed or cashed out before retirement. He also
believes that the government has a dual role as an employer and a policy maker and therefore
should strive to promote the retirement security of its employees (Brainard & Fabry, 2005).
Brainard also claims that although many private sector employers choose to offer defined
contribution plans, larger private sector employers continue to offer defined benefit plans
because the economy of scale leads to smaller administrative costs per employee. Since many
government organizations would be comparable to large private sector employers, the costs per
employee are minimized in the public sector. Furthermore, he says that the size and scope of
large pension funds allows them to smooth out gains and losses over a larger time period which
creates more consistency and reliability of expenses and benefits. Interestingly, Brainard claims
that a portion of the public opposition to defined benefit plans is motivated by interest groups
that would benefit from the transfer of nearly $2 trillion in public retirement assets to the private
sector. He also claims that the corporate governance leverage exerted by large pension funds
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provides an incentive for large corporations to attempt to undermine the influence of public
pension funds (Brainard & Fabry, 2005).
On the other hand, Sandra Fabry claims that state and local public pension plans are a
³WLFNLQJWLPHERPEWKDWLVVHWWRH[SORGH´DQGWKDWWKHSUREOHPEHFRPHVPRUHVHULRXVDV
policymakers delay meaningful reforms (Brainard & Fabry, 2005, p.25). She claims that state
and local governments are accumulating massive unfunded liabilities and that the resulting cost
increases must be borne by taxpayers. Fabry also claims that a transition to defined contribution
plans would not only eliminate unfunded liabilities and investment risks for public employers,
but would also provide public sector employees with more flexibility and control over their
retirement finances. Moreover, she claims that the current system disproportionately rewards
long term employees at the expense of shorter term workers (Brainard & Fabry, 2005). Brainard
and Fabry provide good arguments for both sides of the pension reform debate but do not
analyze specific cities or states, nor do they provide any specific strategies for enacting reform.
,QVXSSRUWRIWKH&DOLIRUQLD¶s defined benefit plans, CalPERS provides a list of the benefits
associated with defined benefits plan in its guidance for local officials. In terms of recruitment
tools, CalPERS claims that defined benefit plans are a major consideration for prospective
employees as more than 30 percent of employees at companies that offer such plans cite the
pension benefits as an important factor in their employment decision compared to only 20
percent at companies that only offer defined contribution plans. Moreover, CalPERS claims that
long-term employees are more likely to stay with their current organizations when defined
benefit plans are offered, thereby increasing institutional knowledge and reducing training and
recruitment costs. In terms of the broader economic impact, CalPERS claims that WKHIXQG¶V
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investments and benefits provide support to California by generating about $35 billion in
statewide economic activity. In addition to generating economic activity, benefits received by
retired employees reduces the cost of social service programs and creates more job opportunities
for younger workers, because older workers can afford to retire earlier (CalPERS, 2011b).
In a 2012 study in The Political Quarterly, John Hutton provides a comprehensive and
balanced perspective on the status of public sector benefits in the United Kingdom. Although,
there are differences between the CalPERS program and the benefits offered in other countries,
many of the recommendations that Hutton offers may have relevance in California. Hutton
argues that a fundamental measure of decency in developed nations is the quality of life that they
provide for their older citizens, and he acknowledges that this is a shared responsibility between
the individual and the state. However, he also argues that the dramatic increase in life
expectancies has produced a situation that is unsustainable. Moreover, he notes that private
sector defined benefit pension plans have rapidly diminished and, as a result, many citizens are
left with inadequate retirement savings (Hutton, 2012).
HXWWRQ¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVDUHEDVHGRQWKHFRQFHSWWKDWSHQVLRQUHIRUPVKRXOGQRWIRFXV
solely on the mathematical costs, but should be based on social equity. He claims that reform
strategies that only reduce benefits will create unforeseen problems for the state and that reform
efforts should focus on keeping defined benefit pensions affordable and sustainable. Using these
concepts, Hutton argues that defined benefit pensions should not be based on final year salary
but should be based on career average earnings. He claims that this change would reduce much
of the volatility associated with late-career promotions and would be more equitable for
taxpayers and beneficiaries. He also argues that employees should bear more of the longevity
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risk and that the retirement age should increase to keep pace with increasing life expectancies
(Hutton, 2012).
A recent study published in Government F inance Review claims that the current economic
VLWXDWLRQKDVUHVXOWHGLQZKDWPDQ\DUHFDOOLQJWKH³1HZ1RUPDO´PHDQLQJWKDt we can no
longer expect the economy to return to previous growth rates. Public pension benefits seem to be
unsustainable and, in the new normal economic environment, government finance officers
should no longer expect tax revenues or financial markets to have a significant resurgence. The
slumping housing market makes it unlikely that property taxes will increase significantly in the
next few years. Moreover, the levels of consumer spending that were spurred by easy credit are
unlikely to return in the short term and will result in lower sales tax revenues for the foreseeable
future. The study also provides an outline for government finance officers to follow when
adjusting employee benefits to the new economic reality. The key steps for adjusting benefits
include developing a clear understanding of revenue projections, conducting a sustainability
assessment, and creating a strategic plan for benefit amendments (Miller & Link, 2009).
,IWKHµQHZQRUPDO¶WKHRU\LVWUXHHven if local governments enact pension reform, there is a
possibility that the fiscal savings will not be sufficient to realign expenditures and revenues on a
long-term basis. If this is the case, policymakers and organizational leaders will be forced to
explore alternative strategies to find a prudent level of service offerings. In an article published
in Public Administration Review, Barry Bozeman explores the theory and practice of managing
decline in public administration. He finds that research on organizational decline was prevalent
in the recessions of the 1970s and 1980s, and research has continued in the private sector;
however, recent public sector research is lacking. One reason for the lack of current public sector
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research is that scholars seem to have concluded that the principles of managing decline in the
public sector are not relevant to the private sector. In the private sector, organizational decline
tends to be focused on managing and emerging from bankruptcy, dealing with debt-based
funding and forced-growth strategies, and focusing on shareholder relations. Bozeman claims
that although some of the mainstream research may have limited relevance, there are enough
similarities that should inspire more public administration research on the topic. In particular, he
cites the human costs of decline, organizational structure, and strategic objectives as three main
topics that have direct relevance to public administration. As local agencies consider layoffs,
Bozeman argues that paying attention to employee morale, ensuring efficient reorganizations,
and planning for long-term revitalization are key concepts that are often overlooked (Bozeman,
2010).
Given that revenues have declined, personnel costs have increased, and there may be a shift
WRZDUGD³QHZQRUPDO´ economic environment, pension reform is a prudent solution to consider;
however, a more fundamental shift in the nature of local government may be required to sustain
the services provided to California communities. Even if local governments choose to reform
pension plans for current and future employees, they still must deal with the financial liabilities
associated with their current retirees. A 2008 article by Jeffery Chapman, written before the
economic downturn, concluded that state and local governments were already on an
unsustainable trajectory. He showed how structural pressures such as demographic changes,
increased mobility among residents and businesses, and the movement from consumption of
goods toward consumption of services have created an unsustainable environment for local
governments. Chapman also examined the impending strain of pension costs for local
governments and found that the cyclical nature of local revenues and investment returns forces
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state and local governments to make large contributions to pension plans when local revenues are
declining. He concluded that state and local governments must make long-term adjustments
toward sustainability by increasing revenue, making adjustments to defined benefit plans and
committing to long-term reserves and automatic expenditure triggers (Chapman, 2008).
Research on defined benefit plans in the public sector shows that the unfunded liabilities are
contributing to an increasingly unsustainable fiscal situation. However, many believe that
reducing benefits will compound the problem by limiting the ability of government agencies to
compete for qualified labor. This may diminish the quality of services provided to the public
unless pension reform is combined with other structural and operational changes. In order to
implement prudent reforms, decision makers need more specific information regarding the
potential outcomes of pension reform. Current research focuses mainly on aggregated unfunded
liability statistics and fails to address specific agencies that will be affected by the proposed
reforms. In addition, much of the research has been derived on data from 2008 and 2009. In
many cases this is the most current data available; however, the tenuous economic recovery that
began in 2010 may significantly affect the fiscal situation. Future research on this topic should
focus on specific government agencies that have proposed or implemented pension reform and
should demonstrate the fiscal and operational impacts of reducing public employee benefits.
Furthermore, data on unfunded liabilities should be updated annually to document the effects of
macroeconomic cycles on public pension funds.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
The recent economic downturn resulted in decreased revenues and increased defined
benefit pension costs for local governments. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the fiscal
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impact of pension reform on two mid-sized local governments in Santa Clara County: Palo Alto
and Sunnyvale. This study quantifies the costs and benefits of pension reform alternatives for
employers and employees, and provides a framework for decision makers to use when
considering changes to local pension plans.
METHODOLOGY
This analysis focuses on the policies associated with offering pension benefits to local
government employees and uses the eightfold path for policy analysis as defined by Eugene
Bardach (Bardach, 2005). In defining the problem, this study analyzes the decisions made by
public officials that have led to the pension crisis, and includes quantitative analyses of projected
pension expenditures for two local governments in Santa Clara County. Evidence is taken from
city budget documents, study-issue reports, CalPERS publications and other public financial
reports. Alternatives include continuing with current benefits, increasing employee contribution
rates for all employees, reducing pension benefits for all employees, reducing pension benefits
for new employees only, and implementing a hybrid plan for new employees only. The criteria
used for each alternative includes the fiscal impact on the employer and the fiscal impact on the
employee.
In projecting the outcomes, this study uses a projection model that simulates costs and
benefits for the average employee under each scenario. It evaluates the employer and employee
cost share under various pension plans and analyzes the impact on each city for the next 5, 10
and 20-year periods. With these projections, this study quantifies the strategies available to
public officials and provides an analysis of tradeoffs that helps decision makers determine which
outcome is most effective.
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Estimates of future costs are based on five scenarios: continuing the current pension plan
for all employees, increasing the current employee contribution rate by 1 percent for all
employees, changing the current pension formulas for all employees, changing the current
pension formulas for new employees, and implementing a hybrid plan for new employees.
Unless there are changes to the California constitution, it will be illegal to change the
current pension formula for all employees because the retirement plans are considered to be
contractually binding for current employees (CalPERS, 2011e). This study will estimate the
fiscal impact of this type of change for comparison purposes only.
When simulating a change in pension plans, this model uses 2.5 percent at 55 for
miscellaneous employees and 3 percent at 55 for safety employees. This represents a modest
change to the current plans in Sunnyvale and Palo Alto. When simulating a hybrid plan, this
model uses the pension plan that provides the lowest defined benefit and assumes the city will
provide a 3 percent salary match in a 401(k) style plan for new employees only. The model also
assumes that the normal employer cost for current plans will remain constant at current levels
and that employees pay their full contribution as determined by CalPERS. Although Palo Alto
and Sunnyvale have different agreements with their employees with respect to the employee
contribution percentage, this analysis assumes that any amount of the employee contribution
percentage that is covered by the city is considered to be supplemental salary and is not counted
as a part of the FLW\¶V pension funding equation.
The analysis of different pension plans relies on the actuarial data provided by CalPERS
as of June 30, 2009, and simulates the costs and benefits that result from different plan options.
)RUHDFKFLW\¶VSODQWKHGDWDLVEDVHGRQWKHDYHUDJHHPSOR\HHDQGSURMHFWLRQVDUHEDVHGRQWKH
29
!

assumption that the average employee will retire at the retirement eligibility age for each plan. It
focuses solely on the normal cost portion of the actuarial valuation which represents the costs for
current employees. It does not address the unfunded liability of each city because these costs are
not affected by changes to plans for new employees. Although pension funding formulas are
derived from projected benefits, market gains or losses, and demographic changes, this analysis
assumes that these factors will remain the same under each scenario. For the purpose of this
study, the life expectancy is 82 years old and annual turnover rate is assumed to be 10 percent.
The turnover rate is based on the updated actuarial values for miscellaneous plans and is
comprised of a 3 percent separation rate and a 7 percent retirement rate. The total number of
employees is assumed to remain constant at FY 2008-09 levels, salary increases are assumed to
be 3.25 percent per year, and the cost of living adjustment for retirees is assumed to be 2 percent
CalPERS currently offers five different plans for miscellaneous employees and five
different benefit plans for public safety employees. Table 3 summarizes the current CalPERS
plans:
Table 3: CalPERS Defined Benefit Plans
Miscellaneous

2% at 60

2% at 55

2.5% at 55

2.7% at 55

3% at 60

Safety

50% at 55

2% at 55

2% at 50

3% at 55

3% at 50

Source: CalPERS. (2010a).

For the purpose of this study, the 3 percent at 60 plan for miscellaneous employees is not
considered because it would be an increase to current plan offerings. Additionally, the 50 percent
at 55 plan for safety employees is not considered because it is administered under different
guidelines than standard plans.
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In 2010, the City of Palo Alto and the City of Sunnyvale both offered the same retirement
plans for their respective employees: 2.7 percent at 55 for miscellaneous employees and 3.0
percent at 50 for public safety employees. 7KHNH\ILJXUHVIRUHDFKFLW\¶VSHQVLRQSODQDUH
summarized in Table 4.
Table 4: Summary of Valuation Data for Palo Alto and Sunnyvale Pension Plans
Palo Alto
Public Safety

Sunnyvale
Public Safety

Palo Alto
Miscellaneous

Sunnyvale
Miscellaneous

192

218

820

712

28.62

28.01

34.63

35.46

Average Salary

$115,036

$144,121

$80,003

$80,153

FY 07-08 Normal Cost

16.768%

15.511%

10.858%

7.503%

FY 08-09 Normal Cost

16.788%

15.579%

10.574%

9.733%

FY 09-10 Normal Cost

16.812%

15.763%

10.142%

9.730%

FY 07-08 Unfunded
Rate

6.843%

10.707%

6.579%

3.397%

FY 08-09 Unfunded
Rate

7.724%

11.458%

6.431%

6.286%

FY 09-10 Unfunded
Rate

7.126%

11.188%

6.921%

5.524%

Active Members
Average Entry Age

Source: CalPERS. (2010a); CalPERS. (2010b); CalPERS; (2010c), CalPERS. (2010d).

Table 5 and Table 6 show the approximate difference in employer contribution
percentages that would result from altering retirement benefit plans for miscellaneous and safety
employees:
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Table 5: Approximate Changes to Employer Contribution Percentage for Miscellaneous
Employees
Benefit Plan

2.0% at 60

2.0% at 55

2.5% at 55

2.7% at 55

-7.95%

-4.80%

-1.65%

0%

% (+/-)
Source: Uppendahl projection model

Table 6: Approximate Changes to Employer Contribution Percentage for Safety Employees
Benefit Plan

2.0% at 55

2.0% at 50

3.0% at 55

3.0% at 50

-9.30%

-8.45%

-4.30%

0%

% (+/-)
Source: Uppendahl projection model

FINDINGS:
Palo Alto is a city of approximately 65,400 residents and, according to the CalPERS
Actuarial Valuation as of June 30, 2009, had 192 active safety members and 820 active
miscellaneous employees. The average safety employee started at the age of 28 and currently
earns $115,000 per year. The average miscellaneous employee started at the age of 35 and
currently earns $80,000 per year. Table 7 demonstrates the total cost of each pension plan option
for Palo Alto.
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Table 7: Projected Normal Costs for Palo Alto Pension Plans
1 Y ear

5 Y ears

10 Y ears

20 Y ears

% C hange

Current Plan

$11,247,986

$59,999,700

$130,372,993

$309,846,402

0%

Contribution
+1%

$10,314,864

$55,020,811

$119,551,817

$284,125,613

(8.30)%

Reduce for
all

$9,340,330

$49,794,541

$108,189,047

$257,112,890

(17.02)%

Reduce for
new

$11,247,986

$58,131,957

$122,373,573

$278,269,643

(10.19)%

Hybrid for
new

$11,247,986

$56,578,695

$115,723,040

$252,019,236

(18.66)%

Source: Uppendahl projection model

As can be seen in Table 7, changing the pension plans for all employees results in the
greatest immediate savings as expense reductions in the first year amount to $1.9 million. The
hybrid model results in the most savings over a 20-year period, with expense reductions totaling
nearly $58 million. It is important to note that the savings for changing pension plans for new
employees are not fully realized until after the fifth year, as it takes time for new employees to
replace existing employees. Increasing the employee contribution rate is the most effective
method to reduce costs in the short term with annual savings of approximately $1 million,
however; it is not is not as effective in the long term.
Sunnyvale is more than twice the size of Palo Alto with 140,000 residents and according
to the CalPERS Actuarial Valuation as of June 30, 2009, had 218 active safety members and 712
active miscellaneous employees. The average safety employee started at the age of 28 and
currently earns $144,000 per year. The average miscellaneous employee started at the age of 35
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and currently earns $80,000 per year. Table 8 demonstrates the total cost of each pension plan
option for Sunnyvale.
Table 8: Projected Normal Costs for Sunnyvale Pension Plans
1 Y ear

5 Y ears

10 Y ears

20 Y ears

%
C hange

Current Plan

$10,903,033

$61,435,906

$134,098,486

$319,410,278

0%

Contribution
+1%

$9,979,671

$56,509,092

$123,390,492

$293,958,508

(7.97)%

Reduce for
all

$8,877,529

$49,900,831

$108,869,492

$259,257,603

(18.83)%

Reduce for
new

$10,903,033

$59,298,386

$124,951,350

$283,309,979

(11.30)%

Hybrid for
new

$10,903,033

$57,829,619

$118,689,903

$258,619,862

(19.03)%

Source: Uppendahl projection model

The results for Sunnyvale are very similar to the results for Palo Alto. Changing the
pension plan for all employees results in the greatest immediate savings with a first year cost
reduction of $2 million. Changing to a hybrid plan is the most effective cost reduction strategy
over the 20 year period, with a total savings of nearly $61 million. As with Palo Alto, increasing
employee contributions results in significant immediate savings but is not as effective in the long
term.
Hybrid plans are the most effective cost reduction strategies for employers because their
annual expenses are limited to a fixed percentage of payroll for the defined contribution portion.
By limiting the employer expense to the lowest benefit plan plus a 3 percent salary match,
employer contributions are much less than the current plan.
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Reducing the pension plan for all employees appears to be a very effective strategy for
reducing costs in the short and long term; however, as previously noted, the current regulations
of CalPERS pension plans do not permit reductions to current employee benefit plans.
Furthermore, even if laws were changed and bargaining units agreed to switch to a defined
contribution plan, it is nearly impossible for cities to implement because GASB rules would
require a change to the amortization schedule. Since there would be no new entrants to the
defined benefit plan, the current rolling amortization, which accounts for new entrants, would be
fixed to 30 years. This change to the amortization base can result in a short-term cost increase of
30 to 40 percent (CalPERS, 2011e). Even if these cities desired to offer defined contribution
plans for new employees only, CalPERS regulations would be prohibitive. In order to offer
CalPERS pension plans, all eligible employee groups are required to participate and contribute to
the retirement pool (CalPERS, 2011c).
The fact that pension plan options for municipalities are significantly restricted by
&DOLIRUQLD¶V Public Employment Retirement Law (PERL) is not lost upon local administrators. A
recent report to the League of California Cities addressed the key issues surrounding pension
reform. While it acknowledges that there are certain strategies that can be undertaken by local
governments and bargaining units, a key theme of the report is the need for changes to the state
constitution. Among the League of California Cities¶ recommendations are a repeal of
SB400/AB616 that would reduce the maximum benefit formula to 2 percent at 60 for
miscellaneous employees and 2 percent at 55 for safety employees, a prohibition of retroactive
pension increases, an increase to the vesting period, an updated benefit structure with more
choices for local agencies, and an option for employers to offer a hybrid plan that caps the
defined benefit to 65 percent of eligible pay and supplements the remainder with a defined
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contribution plan. The most significant recommendation is for a State Constitutional Amendment
that would allow for changes to pension benefit formulas for current employees (Cities
Association of Santa Clara County, 2011).
Analyzing the fiscal impacts of modifying public pension plans shows that the cost of
providing retirement benefits for Palo Alto and Sunnyvale employees can be reduced. Further, it
shows that the potential savings associated with reduced benefits is more than $50 million for
each city over the next twenty years. However, in each scenario, the savings to the cities comes
at a cost to employees. Table 9 demonstrates the costs and benefits to employees under the three
scenarios.
Table 9: Employee Costs and Benefits of Selected Pension Plans
Safety
3%@50
Employee
Contribution

Safety 3%
@55

Safety
Hybrid

Misc. 2.7%
@55

Misc. 2.5%
@55

Misc.
Hybrid

$261,393

$348,431

$444,168

$132,851

$132,851

$295,788

$5,226,555

$6,015,044

$4,494,320

$2,080,440

$1,926,333

$2,209,090

Cost: Benefit
Ratio

19.99

17.26

10.12

15.66

14.50

7.47

Benefit per
year of service

$237,571

$222,779

$166,456

$104,022

$96,317

$88,364

Employee
Benefit

Source: Uppendahl projection model

Table 9 shows that the employee benefits for alternative pension plans are significantly
less than the current plans. For miscellaneous employees, a change from 2.7 percent to 2.5
percent results in a lifetime loss of more than $150,000 per employee. For safety employees, the
lifetime benefit increases when plans are changed from 3 percent at 50 to 3 percent at 55, but it
comes at the cost of 5 more years of work. When viewed as a total benefit per years worked, the
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reduced plan for safety members results in a reduction of nearly $15,000. Hybrid plans result in
even lower benefits for employees, especially when compared to years of service. For safety
employees, the benefit per year of service drops by over $70,000. For miscellaneous employees,
the benefit reduction is more than $15,000 per year of service.
An essential aspect of switching to a hybrid model is the transfer of risk from the
municipality to the employee. Each of the calculations above are based on an assumption of 7.75
percent annual return on investment. As was the case during the recent economic downturn,
when investment returns fall below 7.75 percent, future costs can dramatically increase. When
municipalities offer defined benefit plans, they bear all of the risk and must increase annual
contributions to cover any losses. If municipalities choose to offer hybrid plans, a portion of the
investment risk would be borne by the new employees. Under this scenario, employers would not
see their contribution rates increase for the defined contribution portion, however, the guaranteed
benefit provided to employees would decrease, thereby reducing the retirement security of
municipal employees. Of course, the opposite is also true. If investment returns were to
outperform the current assumptions, employees would reap the rewards as their retirement
portfolios would increase and it is possible that they could achieve greater retirement security
with a hybrid plan.
In addition to projecting the fiscal impact of pension reform, one of the key findings of
this analysis is the relative cost of public services. In particular, the cost differential between
safety and miscellaneous employees is striking. In addition to salary differences, where the
average public safety employee salary is $130,000 and the average miscellaneous employee
salary is $80,000, the normal cost for public safety pension benefits is significantly higher than
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all other employees. Using data as of June 30, 2009, Palo Alto and Sunnyvale spend $21,612 and
$23,917, respectively, per year on the normal cost for each public safety employee. The annual
normal cost for miscellaneous employees is much less, with Palo Alto and Sunnyvale spending
$8,657 and $7,990 per employee, respectively. The differences are similar on the benefit side of
the equation. The average benefit for a public safety employee is currently over $5 million, while
the average benefit for a miscellaneous employee is $2 million, or less than half of what public
safety officers receive. While it is clear that a fundamental function of local government is the
provision of law and order, it is also clear that the costs associated with providing this function
are currently much greater than all other local priorities.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
A crucial factor in the current fiscal crisis is the importance of prudent revenue
forecasting. In 2007, when Sunnyvale and Palo Alto provided enhanced benefits, the revenue
forecasts showed that the benefits were affordable. However, as has been shown, many of those
forecasts turned out to be flawed. Not only has the experience of the last decade shown that local
revenues were not perpetually increasing, but the costs were also greater than anticipated. Part of
the problem in the pension funding equation is the fact that revenues and expenses are
intertwined. By relying on the assumption that the economy will experience perpetual growth,
municipalities over-leveraged their budgetary assumptions. When the economy failed to grow,
local revenues declined. At the same time, the economic stagnation also affected stock market
values, which, in turn, caused the costs of providing defined benefits to increase. By linking both
revenue and expense forecasts to the assumption that the economy would experience perpetual
growth, the cities became extremely vulnerable to external economic changes.
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It should be noted that both cities were somewhat aware of the economic impacts of the
external economic environment before deciding to offer enhanced benefits. ,Q3DOR$OWR¶V
ILQDQFLDOIRUHFDVWWKH\VDLG³WKH)RUHFDVWDVVXPHVFRQWLQXHGVORZEXWVWHDG\HFRQRPLFJURZWK
over the next few years, followed by a recession beginning in 2010-´ (City of Palo Alto, 2007,
p 7). SunnyvalH¶V)<2007-08 bXGJHWDOVRLQFOXGHGFDXWLRQDVWKH\VDLG³National economic
IDFWRUVDUHH[SHFWHGWRPRGHUDWHWKH&LW\¶VHFRQRPLFJURZWKUDWH´DQG³UHFHQWFKDQJHVLQWKH
PRUWJDJHPDUNHWPD\DIIHFWFRQVXPHUV¶ZLOOLQJQHVVWRSXUFKDVHµELJWLFNHW¶LWHPV´ (City of
Sunnyvale, 2007, p. 23) Yet, despite these words of caution, Palo Alto assumed a steady 3
percent revenue growth for the next ten years, and Sunnyvale projected a 2.5 to 3.5 percent
growth in sales tax revenues through FY 2010-11, followed by 4 percent thereafter (City of Palo
Alto, 2007; City of Sunnyvale, 2007).
Recently, both cities took steps toward modifying their pension benefits and reducing
personnel expenses. Since 2008, the City of Palo Alto has eliminated the equivalent of 77 full
time general fund positions, which represents about 10 percent of their general fund workforce.
In addition, after a period of labor negotiations, Palo Alto imposed a change in retirement
benefits for miscellaneous employees from the current 2.7 percent at 55 formula to the 2.0
percent at 60 retirement formula for new hires. Palo Alto is also currently in negotiations with
safety employees (City of Palo Alto, 2011a) The City of Sunnyvale has eliminated or frozen 54
positions since 2009 and is currently operating at its lowest level staffing level since 1995.
$GGLWLRQDOO\6XQQ\YDOH¶V public safety retirement plan has been changed to a 3 percent at 55
formula and negotiations are currently underway with miscellaneous employees. ,QWKHFLW\¶V
long term forecast, they have assumed that the retirement plan will be changed for all
miscellaneous employees beginning in 2012 (City of Sunnyvale, 2011).
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In preparing for changes to employee benefits, both cities have provided good examples
of how to involve their employees and the public in the decision making process. During labor
negotiations with their miscellaneous employees, Palo Alto developed a website dedicated to
tracking and explaining the process. The website included links to public documents, summaries
of financial data, meeting minutes and clear explanations of the fiscal conditions. In addition to
the website, Palo Alto produces a ten-year financial forecasting document prior to HDFK\HDU¶V
budget process. This document is made available to the public and is a tool used by city leaders
to inform their decisions (City of Palo Alto Labor Negotiations Website, 2011).
Although Sunnyvale has not created a website, their unique 20 year budgeting philosophy
has enabled the city to avoid drastic changes in the short term while prudently planning for future
FKDQJHV2YHUWKHSDVWWKUHH\HDUVWKH&LW\0DQDJHU¶VEXGJHWPHVVDJHKDVLQFOXGHGDGLVFXVVLRQ
of the rising personnel costs and the impact that these costs have upon the city¶VILQDQFHV. More
LPSRUWDQWO\6XQQ\YDOH¶VDGKerence to maintaining a balanced budget over 20 years has provided
the city with sufficient reserves to permit a careful evaluation of the recent financial downturn.
An April 2010 article in Government F inance Review RXWOLQHV6XQQ\YDOH¶VEXGJHWVWUDWHJ\DQd
shows how their long-term planning strategy has provided the city with sufficient reserves to
maintain a consistent level of services throughout the various economic cycles that have affected
the Silicon Valley (Bradley & Corbett, 2010).
However, despite the strategies used by Sunnyvale and Palo Alto, both cities were
unprepared for the recent revenue declines and personnel cost increases. As a result, both cities
have been forced to reduce services to their residents and, perhaps more importantly, have
delayed major infrastructure improvements. The City of Sunnyvale has reduced funding for
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improvements to street repairs and park facilities, while the City of Palo Alto has identified an
infrastructure investment backlog of nearly $500 million over the next twenty years (City of Palo
Alto, 2011a; City of Sunnyvale, 2011).
In 2011 the United States economy appears to be stabilizing and, while stock market
values have not recovered to pre-recession levels, they have significantly increased from the
lows seen in 2009. CalPERS reported a 21.7 percent gain for FY 2010-11 and many of the
doomsday predictions about pension costs have been temporarily abated (CalPERS, 2012).
However, it is likely that municipalities will continue to face a new fiscal reality for the
foreseeable future as revenues will take years to recover to the projections made in 2007 and
expenditures are likely to remain unsustainably high for years to come. Municipal leaders will be
forced to decide whether they believe that the economy will recover and return to the perpetual
growth assumptions that were used to endorse current benefit levels. In addition, leaders will
have to decide whether current service levels are fiscally sustainable. If leaders do not believe
that the economy will rebound to previous levels, then pension reform is clearly a prudent and
necessary strategy. However, pension expenses are only a portion of the fiscal and budgetary
issues facing local governments. Modifying pension plans, whether it is by increasing employee
contributions or by implementing a hybrid plan, will only save Sunnyvale and Palo Alto about $5
million each over the next five years. While this is a significant dollar amount, it is unlikely to be
enough to offset the miscalculated revenue projections used in 2007. Furthermore, the
infrastructure needs of each city are significant and any change to pension plans will not be the
all-encompassing strategy that solves the fiscal crisis.
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Unless the economy rapidly recovers and begins a new era of expansion, local leaders
should assume that they are operating in a ³new normal´ fiscal environment as described by
Miller and Link (2009). Under this scenario, local governments should continue to use hiring
freezes, furloughs and potentially more layoffs to reset their expenditure levels. It is also
imperative to implement many of the strategies outlined by Fishbein and Vehaun (2009), such as
managing vacancies, determining optimal staffing levels, utilizing shared service agreements and
considering privatization policies for functions that can be delivered by the private sector. At the
same time, more consideration should be given to the practice of managing decline and creating
a more capable and adaptable workforce to provide services with reduced staffing.
A recent policy position paper by the Santa Clara County City Managers Association also
provides a comprehensive list of effective strategies for containing compensation costs. Among
these strategies are limiting labor agreements to allow for timely adjustments to economic
conditions, avoiding compensation formulas that are tied to other agencies, creating regional
consistency in compensation packages, and requiring employees to pay their full share of
pension funding obligations (Santa Clara County/City Management Association, 2011).
Yet, at the same time, it is important to realize that public administrators provide value to
communities and that the public sector must remain competitive in the local labor market.
Research by the Economic Policy Institute showed that public sector employees tend to be more
highly educated than their private sector counterparts; yet even current public sector
compensation levels are lower than the private sector when adjusted for organizational size and
education levels (Keefe, 2010). Despite the recent headlines documenting lavish pension benefits
for a select few, according to CalPERS the average public pension benefit for miscellaneous
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employees is only $28,356 annually, and these employees have worked an average of 20 years
(CalPERS, 2011b). In addition, demands on the public sector will continue to increase and the
impending retirement of the Baby Boomer generation threatens to diminish much of the
institutional knowledge within the public administration sphere (Chapman, 2008). If this
problem is compounded by over-correcting current compensation levels, municipalities may
soon lack qualified employees and may be unable to provide vital public services.
At the heart of this issue is the value of professional public servants that have the
institutional knowledge that is essential to sustained effective government. In the current fiscal
environment it is convenient to look at municipal budgets and see that personnel costs are rapidly
increasing and that pension benefits are a primary driver of the expenses. However, it is also
convenient to forget how local governments ended up in this situation. During the dot-com
boom, many local governments had difficulty recruiting and retaining capable professional
administrators because the labor market was extremely competitive and public sector
compensation was perceived to be insufficient. In order to attract and retain qualified personnel,
especially in the Bay Area, municipalities increased compensation packages (Santa Clara County
Civil Grand Jury, 2010). As more municipalities choose to reduce pension benefits, the public
sector will become a less desirable profession for potential employees, and the quality of public
service may diminish. Furthermore, iQDQHUDRIµQHZQRUPDO¶ILVFDOFRnditions, residents and
elected officials must decide whether they expect the government to have two roles as both an
employer and a policy maker, and to operate under higher standards than their private sector
counterparts. If higher standards are expected from local governments, then communities should
expect to pay a higher price for qualified employees.
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Nonetheless, it is clear that without significant increases to local revenue in the Silicon
Valley, municipalities like Palo Alto and Sunnyvale should reduce pension plans for new
employees and should require larger contributions from current employees. Palo Alto has already
taken these steps with its miscellaneous employees, and they should continue this policy for
safety employees as well. Since they chose to reduce their miscellaneous plan to 2 percent at 60,
they should make similar reductions to their public safety plan by imposing a 2 percent at 55
plan. Sunnyvale has reduced its public safety plan to 3 percent at 55, and should make equitable
reductions to its miscellaneous plan by insisting upon a 2.5 percent at 55 plan. Employee
contributions should be increased in both cities, and policy makers should enact policies that
incrementally increase employee contributions over the next few years until employees pay their
full share. If economic conditions improve, policy makers could choose to reward long-term
employees by incrementally covering portions of their employee share instead of granting salary
increases.
More importantly, policies should be enacted to revise revenue projection methodologies.
The recent recessions caused by the dot-com bust and the housing crisis show that sales tax
revenues are extremely volatile. Therefore, cities in the Silicon Valley should never assume that
sales tax revenues will perpetually increase. Revenue projections should never exceed the
average of a complete business cycle and should always assume near-zero growth rates in the
short-term. Furthermore, policies should be enacted to deposit any short-term revenue windfalls
into long-term reserves for personnel expenses and infrastructure funding. Such a policy could
mandate that any sales tax windfalls be placed in an emergency reserve for at least five years.
During the five year period, these windfalls should be used to mitigate future sales tax shortfalls.
If revenues are steadily increasing after five years, the windfall reserves should be used solely for
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one-time infrastructure investments or payments toward unfunded pension liabilities. If these
types of policies were in place in 2007, it is highly unlikely that policy makers would have been
able to grant enhanced benefits and the current fiscal crisis would be substantially less daunting.
Finally, municipal leaders should continue working toward regional and state-level
reforms that will create a more equitable and stable compensation structure. Efforts by the Civil
Grand Jury, the Santa Clara County City Managers Association, and the League of California
Cities have been instrumental in bringing clarity to the current fiscal crisis and these efforts
should continue. Regional consistency is also critical because fiscal issues and labor markets
vary widely across the state and therefore any state-level solution will likely be insufficient for
certain regions. Additional research is needed to analyze the long-term impacts of recent reform
efforts, and should focus on the actual savings achieved by municipalities after implementing
reforms, as well as the impacts on employee morale and workforce turnover rates.
As the economy begins to recover from the ³*UHDW5HFHVVLRQ´ municipalities are
confronted with the daunting reality that administering an effective government will be fiscally
challenging for the foreseeable future. Even if the stock market produces consistent returns at or
above the current assumptions, it is likely that pension plans will remain woefully underfunded.
This study shows that pension reform is necessary, although the reforms will take years to result
in significant cost reductions for local governments. Therefore, pension reform is just one of the
fiscal strategies that will be required for municipalities to become sustainable. This study also
showed that pension reform will significantly reduce the financial benefits associated with public
service and may constrain the ability of local governments to remain competitive in local labor
markets. Policy makers will face difficult decisions regarding employee compensation and public
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administrators will need to adapt to this new fiscal reality in order to meet escalating demands
with less resources at their disposal.
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